Consequentialism is a class of normative ethical theories holding that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action (or rule, institution, or policy) depends entirely on its consequences—specifically, on whether it produces a “better” overall balance of good over bad than the available alternatives. In the pursuit of liberty, consequentialism offers one of the most empirically grounded, and some would say powerful, frameworks for evaluating political systems, as it judges institutions by their real-world results rather than by abstract principles, divine commands, or inherent “rights.”
While consequentialism has deep roots in mainstream philosophy and is widely applied in economics, law, and public policy, it has been deployed with particular force by a few anarcho-capitalist thinkers. Foremost among them is economist and legal scholar David Friedman, whose consequentialist arguments in The Machinery of Freedom demonstrate that a stateless society organized around private property and voluntary exchange consistently outperforms coercive government in delivering security, justice, prosperity, and individual flourishing.
History and Development#
The idea that consequences matter morally appears in ancient thought (e.g., Epicurean focus on pleasure and pain), but modern consequentialism crystallized in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) launched classical utilitarianism, arguing that actions are right insofar as they promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number. John Stuart Mill refined this in Utilitarianism (1863), distinguishing higher and lower pleasures and defending the theory against charges of being a “doctrine worthy only of swine.”
Later developments include G.E. Moore’s “ideal utilitarianism” (which broadened intrinsic goods beyond pleasure to include beauty and friendship) and R.M. Hare’s preference utilitarianism (maximizing the satisfaction of informed preferences). In the 20th century, consequentialism expanded beyond utilitarianism into forms such as ethical egoism and negative consequentialism (focused on minimizing suffering). It became central to cost-benefit analysis in economics and to movements like effective altruism.
Core Principles and Variants#
Consequentialism is teleological: the ends justify (or condemn) the means. An act, rule, or institution is morally required if and only if it produces (or is expected to produce) the best overall consequences.
Major variants include:
- Act consequentialism: Evaluate each individual action by its direct consequences.
- Rule consequentialism: Adopt rules whose general acceptance yields the best outcomes (a hybrid that addresses some criticisms of pure act theories).
- Utilitarianism: Maximize aggregate utility/well-being (hedonistic, preference-based, or ideal forms).
- Other forms: Egoistic consequentialism (maximize one’s own good), altruistic versions, or negative consequentialism (prioritize reducing the worst harms).
Consequentialists disagree about what counts as a good consequence—pleasure, preference satisfaction, capabilities, or some objective list of values—but agree that only consequences ultimately matter for moral evaluation.
Mainstream Positions, Applications, and Criticisms#
In mainstream ethics and policy, consequentialism underpins much of modern economics, bioethics, environmental policy, and criminal justice. It supports evidence-based approaches: if a policy (e.g., free trade, drug legalization, or private charity over welfare) demonstrably improves human welfare more than alternatives, it is morally preferable regardless of traditional intuitions about “duties” or “rights.”
Strengths emphasized by proponents:
- Practical and flexible—adapts to new evidence and circumstances.
- Aligns with scientific reasoning and cost-benefit analysis.
- Avoids rigid rules that produce bad results in edge cases.
Common criticisms:
- Calculation problem: Outcomes are often unpredictable or involve vast numbers of people across time.
- Demands too much: Requires constant maximization, leaving little room for personal projects or special relationships.
- Ignores justice and rights: Could, in principle, justify framing an innocent person if it deters more crime overall, or sacrificing one to save many.
- Aggregation issues: How to weigh different people’s welfare? Does it permit “tyranny of the majority”?
- “Ends justify the means”: Historically invoked to rationalize atrocities.
Defenders respond that these problems are overstated in practice, that rule consequentialism or sophisticated versions mitigate them, and that deontological alternatives often produce even worse outcomes when rigidly applied (e.g., absolute pacifism in the face of aggression).
Consequentialism in Libertarian and Anarcho-Capitalist Thought#
Within libertarian circles, consequentialism provides an alternative (or complement) to natural-rights or deontological arguments. Instead of claiming that taxation is inherently theft or that the state violates pre-political rights, consequentialists argue that government institutions systematically produce inferior results—more poverty, violence, inefficiency, and coercion—than voluntary alternatives. This approach is especially appealing because it does not require agreement on contested moral foundations; it appeals to observable outcomes that most people already value (safety, wealth, opportunity, peace).
David D. Friedman’s Consequentialist Defense of Anarcho-Capitalism#
Unlike Murray Rothbard, other natural-rights anarcho-capitalists, and anti-subjectivist libertarians—who argue that the state is immoral because it necessarily violates individual rights or consent through taxation, conscription, and monopoly on force—Friedman defends the abolition of the state on the grounds that private, competitive institutions will deliver better consequences.
In his landmark book The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism (1973; revised editions 1989 and 2014), Friedman explicitly states that “utilitarian arguments, or consequentialist arguments more generally, are usually the best way to defend” libertarian positions. He does not claim to be a strict utilitarian but employs a broad cost-benefit framework: compare the expected outcomes of a stateless society based on private property and voluntary exchange against those of even the best possible state.
Key elements of Friedman’s consequentialist case:
Private production of law and order: Government police and courts are monopolies that face poor incentives. Competitive private defense agencies, insurance companies, and arbitration firms would compete on price, quality, and reputation. Victims would be compensated more reliably; aggressors would face swift, market-driven justice. Historical and contemporary examples (medieval Iceland’s commonwealth, modern private security, international arbitration) illustrate that complex legal systems can function without a central coercive authority.
Public goods and externalities: Friedman systematically dismantles claims that markets fail to provide national defense, roads, or environmental protection. Private mechanisms—such as assurance contracts, covenants, and reputation—solve these problems more efficiently than tax-funded monopolies.
Incremental transition: Rather than violent revolution (which he rejects as likely to produce worse outcomes), Friedman advocates gradual privatization of government functions. Each step can be evaluated by its results; successful experiments build momentum toward full anarcho-capitalism.
Empirical superiority: He argues that the state, whatever its intentions, predictably serves concentrated interests at the expense of the dispersed public. Evidence from regulation, welfare, immigration restrictions, and foreign policy shows systematic failure. A competitive market in governance would align incentives with consumer (citizen) preferences far better.
Friedman contrasts his approach directly with rights-based anarcho-capitalism. In interviews and writings, he notes that natural-rights advocates often imagine an ideal legal code derived from first principles, while consequentialists focus on what actually works. He acknowledges that evaluating “better” consequences requires some shared values, but observes that most people already agree on core goods—personal security, material prosperity, freedom to pursue one’s ends—and that anarcho-capitalism outperforms the state on these metrics by wide margins.
His later works, such as Law’s Order and Legal Systems Very Different from Ours, reinforce the consequentialist project by showing how economic analysis explains the evolution of efficient legal rules and how real-world polycentric legal orders have succeeded without centralized states.
Why Friedman’s Approach Matters for Liberty#
Friedman’s consequentialism is particularly potent for the anarcho-capitalist project because it sidesteps endless, yet vital, philosophical debates over the existence or content of rights. By focusing on measurable outcomes—lower crime, higher wealth creation, greater innovation, more peaceful dispute resolution—it offers a falsifiable, evidence-driven case that a society without rulers can be not only viable but vastly preferable. In an era of growing skepticism toward state institutions, his framework continues to equip advocates of radical liberty with arguments that persuade on practical grounds.
Further reading
- David D. Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom (third edition freely available as PDF at daviddfriedman.com)
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Consequentialism
- Friedman’s essays and talks contrasting consequentialist and natural-rights approaches (available on his website and YouTube)
